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Free will, compatibilism, and the human nature wars: 
Should we be worried?




The ‘human nature wars’ are the controversies over sociobiology and its successor theories evolutionary psychology, biopsychology and the like. A common theme in these wars is the fear that, if what the sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists and the rest are saying is true, then we humans are mere puppets, or, in other words, have no free will. It is not being claimed that sociobiologists and their friends are depriving us of free will just by saying what they say, or that they should be punished for being the bearers of bad tidings if what they say is true. Rather, it is being claimed that believing their teachings will lead people to conclude that we have no free will, and consequently to disclaim responsibility for their actions. For example:

If we are programmed to be what we are, then these traits are ineluctable. We may, at best, channel them, but we cannot change them either by will, education, will, or culture. 
[Gould 1978, p. 238]

… for [Edward O.] Wilson human males have a genetic tendency towards polygyny, females towards constancy (don’t blame your mates for sleeping around, ladies, it’s not their fault they are genetically programmed). 
[Rose 1978, quoted in Dawkins 1982, p. 10.]

	For this to constitute a fair criticism of sociobiologists and their friends, it needs to be shown, not only that their claims have these undesirable implications, but also that they are making the relevant claims without sufficient evidence, so that they are giving philandering men and other ne’er-do-wells a false excuse for their behaviour. This latter point has not been lost on the critics, however, who do attempt to show the inadequacy of the evidence for such ‘human nature’ claims. Moreover, over and above the worry about giving people excuses for bad behaviour, is the worry that telling people that they are, in fact, significantly less free than they had thought is liable to cause them great distress:

A young woman asked the lecturer, a prominent ‘sociobiologist’, whether there was any evidence for genetic sex differences in human psychology. I hardly heard the answer, so astonished was I by the emotion with which the question was put. The woman seemed to set great store by the answer and was almost in tears. After a moment of genuine and innocent bafflement the explanation hit me. Something or somebody, certainly not the eminent sociobiologist himself, had misled her into thinking that genetic determination is for keeps; she seriously believed that a ‘yes’ answer to her question would, if correct, condemn her as a female individual to a life of feminine pursuits, chained to the nursery and the kitchen sink. [Dawkins 1982, p. 11]

 	For both these reasons, one might argue, scientists should only be allowed to tell people this if they have sufficient evidence (if even then).
	Rather than saying: ‘the news is bad but don’t shoot the messenger’, sociobiologists and their friends have usually defended themselves by arguing that their claims do not lead to the conclusion that we are any less free. The standard strategies used by Dawkins (1982, Chapter 2), Pinker (2002), and other scientists in this camp are of two kinds: (1) They say that genetic determinism is a straw man – that neither they nor anybody else thinks that environment plays no role in determining how an organism turns out; (2) they say tu quoque to their opponents – i.e. they argue that a trait that is a product of culture, upbringing, etc. is no less determined than one that is a product of genes, and consequently that their opponents’ view is no less determinist than their own. 
	Of the second strategy it can hardly be said that it defuses the worry about giving excuses to ne’er-do-wells, or that it alleviates any distress one might feel on being told that one is not free. At best, it spreads the blame for giving people the excuse, and for causing the distress, around a bit. Moreover, one might want to believe that at least some of one’s actions are determined neither by one’s genes nor by one’s environment, so that any scientific claim that encroaches on this from either the biological or the sociological direction is bad news. The first strategy I will say more about a little later. 
	The strategy that is likely to occur to any philosopher is to appeal to a compatibilist argument regarding free will. In brief, it is to show that whether an action is determined by prior causes or not has no bearing on whether or not it is free. This strategy has been pursued by Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature after Darwin (2000). The aim of Richards’ book overall is to defuse many of the worries people commonly have about the claims of sociobiologists and their friends – worries about politically reactionary or quietist implications, for example. Knowing that one of these worries is that we are being claimed to be ‘blameless puppets’, she argues that this worry arises because of misunderstandings of what free will actually is. In arguing this, she uses standard arguments for compatibilism, such as are familiar from classic compatibilist accounts (e.g. Ryle 1949, Chapter III, Ayer 1954, Frankfurt 1969). In this paper I want to evaluate such uses of compatibilist arguments. I will conclude that they do not successfully defuse the worry. Before it can be defused, I will argue, we will need to have a clearer account of what exactly sociobiologists and their friends are claiming than has so far been given in the literature.

1. Why we might be worried

	Let’s look at bit more at the standard first line of defence that sociobiologists and their friends employ. Dawkins (op. cit.) has shown that we need to distinguish between genetic selectionism and genetic determinism. The former is the claim that, insofar as any traits of an organism are products of natural selection, they will be such as to promote the replication of the organism’s genes. Thus, for example, genetic selectionism involves the rejection of group selection, and the endorsement of the claim that sexually reproducing organisms, insofar as their behaviour is a product of natural selection, are more likely to make sacrifices for kin than for non-kin, in the pattern predicted by Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1964). But these claims leave it completely open just which behaviours, or any other traits, are products of natural selection, and how important other factors, such as constraint and drift, are in trait-formation (a point carefully emphasised by Sterelny and Kitcher in their 1988 defence of genetic selectionism). Genetic determinism, by contrast, seems to be the view that, given that an organism possesses such-and-such a gene, it is inevitable that it will develop such-and-such a trait. It is a little difficult to precisely characterise this view, because no way of stating it comes remotely close to any view that anybody has ever held. Everybody from Genetics 101 upwards knows that the expression of a gene depends on environmental factors, and it is difficult to see how anybody could have thought that anybody thought otherwise. 
	Things are not quite as simple as that, however, for two reasons. Firstly, although evolutionary psychologists regularly claim that every trait is a joint product of genes and environment, they also claim that there is a species-typical set of cognitive mechanisms that are as universal as the physical anatomy of our bodies, and reliably develop in a wide variety of different environments by virtue of being guarded against environmental vicissitudes:

Because the world is full of potential disruptions, there is the perennial threat that the developmental process may be perturbed away from the narrow targets that define mechanistic workability, producing some different and nonfunctional outcome. Developmental adaptations are, therefore, intensely selected to evolve machinery that defends the developmental process against disruption (Waddington 1962). … More generally, developmental programs are often designed to respond to environmentally or genetically induced disorder through feedback-driven compensation that redirects development back towards the successful construction of adaptations. 
[Cosmides and Tooby 1992, pp. 80-81]

.	The mechanisms by which these cognitive mechanisms are guarded against disruption of development are never specified beyond the vague expression ‘feedback-driven compensation’. Instead, an adaptationist argument is deployed to render plausible the claim that they are. (For a sceptical view on this, see Garvey 2005.)
	If this is true, it may revive the fears aroused by genetic determinism, as the capacity for environmental variation to produce different outcomes is cancelled out to a large extent. This may be mitigated by the fact that evolutionary psychologists no more adhere to the insane view called ‘genetic determinism’ than anybody else does, and consequently they accept that it is possible in principle to intervene in developmental processes to prevent undesirable traits from developing. But this is counterbalanced by their claim that the cognitive mechanisms are developmentally robust to a degree comparable to basic features of anatomy. To say that one has a choice about the structure of one’s circulatory system would be very strange, because human undoing of the processes by which that structure develops, while still producing a viable organism, would require a lot more knowledge of those processes than we currently possess. Consequently, any cognitive mechanisms that we possess that are developmentally robust to a similar degree are going to be similarly difficult to do anything about for a long time. At this point, evolutionary psychologists could fall back on the tu quoque argument, and challenge their opponents to justify the tacit claim that traits that are culturally variable are any easier to change, or that we have any better idea of how to change them, than ones that are species-typical and evolved. This argument, then, looks pretty inconclusive. Either way, however, it is not so much an issue about free will, rather than one about how easy or difficult it is for social, biological or cognitive engineers to modify people’s psychological traits.
	But there is another reason why worries about free will might arise in connection with sociobiology and its friends. This is in connection with a claim that forms a central pillar of sociobiology’s most prominent successor-theory, evolutionary psychology. This central pillar is the modularity thesis – i.e. the thesis that the mind consists wholly or largely of special-purpose, dedicated, cognitive mechanisms. For evolutionary psychologists, this thesis is explicitly grounded in adaptationist arguments, to the effect that adaptations are solutions to specific problems that arise at specific places and times, and to the effect that de-coupling of function is advantageous. So, strictly speaking, these arguments only have force insofar as our cognitive architecture consists of adaptations, allowing for much cognitive architecture that neither consists of adaptations nor is modular. But evolutionary psychologists typically believe that most of our architecture does consist of adaptations, and hence that it is modular. 
	One of the key features of cognitive modules is that their operation is mandatory. Fodor explains this with simple examples: 

You can’t help hearing the utterance of a sentence (in a language you know) as an utterance of a sentence, and you can’t help seeing a visual array as consisting of objects distributed in three-dimensional space. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the other perceptual modes: you can’t, for instance, help feeling what you run your fingers over as the surface of an object. 
[Fodor 1983, pp. 52-3]

A consequence of this is that cognitive processes that are modular take place even in spite of other information that the mind might have. This can be illustrated with optical illusions. The Muller-Lyer lines appear different lengths. Even when one has measured the lines and seen that they are the same, the optical illusion doesn’t go away. This suggests that whatever part of the mind processes visual input does not receive all the information that is available to other parts of the mind. The knowledge that the lines are the same length does not seem to get through to the visual-processing mechanism – it still ‘thinks’ they are different lengths. Evolutionary psychologists would add to this story that it is because evolution hasn’t prepared us for this trick that the Muller-Lyer lines appear different lengths in the first place. There presumably weren’t any Muller-Lyer lines around in the Stone Age.
It is relatively uncontroversial that sense-perception and language comprehension are underpinned by cognitive modules. But evolutionary psychologists claim that a whole host of other things are as well. They claim that evolution has bequeathed us a host of automatic responses to situations, which are to be understood as responses that would have been fitness-enhancing for Stone Age humans. They are careful to distinguish their claim from the superficially plausible idea that evolution has bequeathed us a general desire to survive or to reproduce, which in turn explains why we have the more specific responses that we have. Among these automatic responses are the experience of certain tastes as pleasurable, and the perception of certain kinds of people as sexually attractive. Given that we live in a different world today, acting on those responses may not be fitness-enhancing even though it was in the Stone Age. Eating as much sugar-containing food as one could get would be a good strategy in an environment where there wasn’t very much of it around, but it would be a very poor strategy today. Even evolutionary psychologists hold that we don’t have to act on these automatic responses. But they emphasise that the responses themselves are things we have no control over:

Human behavior is flexible, of course, but this flexibility is of means, not ends, and the basic experiential goals that motivate human behavior are both inflexible and specific. For example, assume that we, along with many other primates, possess a specialized gustatory mechanism underpinning the sensation of sweetness. This mechanism was shaped by natural selection in ancestral populations because a sugar-producing fruit is most nutritious when its sugar content is highest, hence individuals who detected and liked sugar produced, on average, more progeny than did individuals who could not detect sugar or who actually preferred the taste of green or overripe or rotten fruit. Since human behavior is so flexible, we have been able to develop virtually an infinite number of ways of obtaining sugar; but the goal of eating sugar remains the same – to experience the sensation of sweetness.
	In modern industrial societies, where refined sugar is abundantly available, the human sweet tooth may be dysfunctional, but sugar still tastes sweet, and the goal of experiencing sweetness still motivates behavior. That’s how we’re made. We can decide to avoid refined sugar, but we can’t decide to experience a sensation other than sweetness when sugar is on our tongues. …
	In summary, although human behavior is uniquely flexible, the goal of this behavior is the achievement of specific experiences – such as sweetness, being warm, and having high status. [Symons 1992, pp. 138-9]

	So the claim is that, not just the sensation of sweetness, but the desire to eat sweet things arises mandatorily, just as the perception of a visual array as a three-dimensional object does. To go back to the particular example mentioned by Rose, the analogous claim is not that men can’t help philandering, but that the temptation to philander arises mandatorily. Still, we might say, nobody is claiming that we are compelled to act on such temptations, so they do not count as restrictions of our freedom. Things are not quite that simple, however.

2. A compatibilist argument

Arguments for compatibilism usually consist of two strands: (1) they set out to show that what the classical free will theorist wants – acts that are not determined, and are free – is incoherent, and hence cannot be had in any case; (2) they then set out to show that an act can be determined and yet be free. I will mention just two popular strategies for showing the first: (i) Hume’s ‘other fork’: an event that is not determined is random, but a random event is not a free act; (ii) the argument that nothing can be the cause of itself. The strength of these two arguments is their extreme generality. They do not depend on particular scientific claims – not even very general claims such as that the world consists of matter in motion or that everything has a cause. But all that they show is that the classical free-will theorist is making demands that cannot be met; by themselves they do nothing to reassure us that we have free will. It is the second strand of the compatibilist argument that interests me here. (Strictly speaking, the first strand could just as easily be part of an argument for denying free will as for compatibilism, so only the second strand should be called ‘the compatibilist argument’ – which is what I will do from here on.)
	The basic thrust of the compatibilist argument is to show that the hard determinist, in saying that we’re not free because we’re determined, is misunderstanding what it is to be free. This is sometimes cast as a misunderstanding about how we use the word ‘free’, but this is not the place to debate the merits of ‘ordinary language philosophy’ versus ‘robust metaphysics’. For present purposes I am assuming that the compatibilist argument works, and that it proves something about the real nature of freedom, not just about the way we use words. Compatibilists often present their arguments as reassurances that any type of freedom ‘worth wanting’ is perfectly possible even if all our actions are determined (e.g. Dennett 1984). The hard determinist, it is alleged, conflates two very different circumstances in which one might say: ‘I’m not free because …’ On the one hand, the hard determinist would have us say ‘I’m not free because my actions are determined by prior causes’. On the other hand, there are specific circumstances in which we might say ‘I’m not free to do x because …’ But, the compatibilist urges, if the only reason I can be said to be not free is because my actions are determined, then there is no reasonable cause for concern: I am not unfree in any sense that I should be worried about. Examples of lack of freedom that I should be worried about include the following: 

	(1) ‘I’m not free to stand up because I’m tied to this chair’; 
	(2) ‘I’m not free to leave the house because I’m locked in’; 
	(3) ‘I’m not free to run around because my legs are paralysed.’

	In these examples, I simply and literally cannot do something, no matter how much I might want to. Closely related to these are cases where one is compelled to do something, in the sense that one simply and literally cannot not do it. Some of the cases above can be changed into these by re-wording, e.g.: 

	(4) ‘I’m compelled to stay in the house because I’m locked in.’

	But more positive actions may fall into this category as well:

	(5) ‘I’m compelled to cough because of a tickly throat.’

	One difference between these cases and the hard determinist claim is that they all describe a lack of freedom to do a specific thing, or being compelled to do a specific thing. The person who is tied to the chair may still be free to move her head or sing a song. By contrast, the hard determinist claim is all-embracing: it implies that I am not free ever. We might consider more extreme cases, such as a person who is gagged and bound hand and foot, or one who is completely paralysed. Still, we might say, such a person is free to think about this or that. And a person who is compelled to do something does not have to like it. Perhaps only an inanimate object is truly completely unfree in the sense of the above examples. But we haven’t yet clarified what that sense is, nor how it is relevantly different from the hard determinist’s sense of unfreedom. 
	As a first stab, I suggest that what is common to the above examples is that, even if I want to do something, I can’t. I am not free to do something that I want – or might want – to do. This is, however, very different from the sense in which the hard determinist claims that we are not free. For the hard determinist does not deny that we often do what we want. Indeed, the hard determinist is perfectly willing to concede that our wants are part of the causal chain that leads to our actions. I went to the shop because I wanted to buy a newspaper; I drank herbal tea because I wanted to get a good night’s sleep. So the hard determinist is perfectly happy to say, not only that I often do what I want, but also that I do it because I want to – that is, that my want causes me to do it. But the hard determinist says, in addition, that it is precisely because my action came at the end of a chain of causes and effects at all, that it is not free. And this is so, they continue, whether that chain of causes and effects includes a want of mine or not. 
	The problem that the compatibilist has with this is that it conflates two very different types of case. In the first type, I can’t do something that I want to; in the second type I do something precisely because I want to. In cases (1) – (5), the only freedom worth wanting that I’m denied is freedom to do as I want. The tied-up etc. scenarios fall short of what’s worth wanting, not because the victim’s actions are determined, but because she can’t do what she wants.
	Applying this to the worries about sociobiology and its friends, then, suggests a way to defuse them. For sociobiologists are not claiming that we are not able to do what we want – or at least they are not adding any restrictions on our ability to do what we want, beyond ones that we are already perfectly familiar with, such as not being able to grow wings or being tied up at a given time. Following this line we might say: the philandering male does not escape blame, because he is doing what he wants, unlike somebody who was physically forced to philander. And the young woman at the lecture need not have been worried, because nobody was telling her that she had to be a stay-at-home housewife if she didn’t want to. 

	But so far, all we have really shown is that it is possible to be free even if one’s actions are determined. Assuming the argument so far works, we have refuted the hard determinist’s claim that just because our actions are determined they are not free. But we have not necessarily shown that, if evolutionary psychologists are right, we are still free. This is because we have only shown that some determined actions are free. This in turn is because no compatibilist claims that we are free in absolutely every way (whatever that might mean). The examples above are meant to show circumstances in which it would be right to say that I am not free. So the conclusion of the compatibilist argument is only that some of the things I do are free.	As it stands, this is a non-sequitur; for we have not shown that the way in which we can fail to be free that I’ve described (‘I want to do x but I can’t’) is the only way in which we can fail to be free. Until we consider any other ways, we leave open the possibility that evolutionary psychology reveals our actions, or at least a worryingly large number of them, to be unfree after all. 

	To determine whether this is the case, we need to look at a more exhaustive selection of cases where even the compatibilist would say that I am not free. A different type of case from the ones so far considered can be illustrated by the following examples:

	(6) ‘I’m not free to leave the country because I’m on probation’;
	(7) ‘I’m compelled to hand over my wallet because a mugger is pointing a 			knife at me.’

	In these cases, unlike the previous ones, it is not the case that I simply and literally cannot do something, no matter how much I might want to. I could, if I wanted to, leave the country, or give the mugger two fingers. These seem at first sight to be cases where my freedom is restricted, but not by not being able to do what I want. Perhaps we can assimilate cases of this kind to cases of the first, by thinking of them as cases where I am not free to do what I want, where what I want to do includes evading some unpleasant consequence. Thus: I want to leave the country, but not only that but I want to leave the country and not suffer the penalty of being brought back to prison, or at least of having to keep in hiding. 

	More needs to be said about cases of this kind, however. It seems wrong to say that what I am not free to do is leave-the-country-and-avoid-penalties, or keep-my-wallet-and-not-get-stabbed. In fact, the former case is still not accurately so described in any case, as there are things I could do to evade capture if I did skip the country. We would have to expand it to ‘leave-the-country-and-avoid-penalties-and-not-go-into-hiding-and-not-have-to-bribe-the-local-police-and …’ An alternative, more natural, way to describe the situation is that I am not free to leave the country tout court, or that I am compelled to hand over my wallet tout court, in the sense that my freedom is restricted in respect of specifically those things. Perhaps our reluctance to say just this is misplaced. Looking back at the earlier cases: a person with strong willpower could struggle fiercely until she has loosened the ropes, or break a window, or even chip away at the walls Count-of-Monte-Cristo style. Only in the paralysis case is it absolutely clear that the person literally can’t do the thing that she wants.​[1]​ Be that as it may, an alternative way to describe cases (1), (2) and (4) to (7), rather than saying that it’s impossible for me to do something, is to say that my freedom is restricted inasmuch as doing something is made more difficult. This allows us to avoid cumbrous locutions such as ‘not-free-to-leave-the-country-and …’ and it also allows us to treat all the cases so far (apart, possibly, from (3)) as cases of the same kind. A consequence of this is that one can be restricted in one’s freedom to do something even in cases where it is possible for one to do it. A second consequence is that freedom to do x is allowed to be a matter of degrees. Harry Frankfurt (1969) makes much of the differences in how much we can be impressed by threats – how bad we judge the consequences to be, how likely we think they are to be carried out, and so on, and argues that the degree to which we hold someone morally responsible is, at least in part, a function of this. These two points will be important later.

3. Psychological compulsions and hypothetical wants

There remains a different class of cases where we might say that a person’s freedom is restricted in a way that she should be worried about. This class includes addictions, phobias and other psychological compulsions.

	(8) ‘I’m not free to leave the house because I’m agoraphobic’;
	(9) ‘I'm compelled to smoke because I’m addicted’;
	(10) ‘I’m compelled to count the paving-stones because I have OCD.’

	In these cases, far from it being harder to do what I want, I am doing what I want – or, in (8), avoiding doing what I don’t want – at least prima facie. So acting on a desire that arises mandatorily may prove to be sufficiently relevantly similar to such cases to count as a restriction on freedom that I should be worried about as well. There are a number of different possible ways to describe the psychological-compulsion cases, however. These may amount to actually different possibilities, although that doesn’t matter for present purposes. In any event, we will need to consider them before we can decide on the mandatory-desire issue. Specifically, we will need to look at the ways in which addictions etc. can be said to be restrictions on freedom, in order to decide whether mandatory desires count as restrictions on freedom as well.

(A) I’m not doing what I want, despite appearances.

(Ai) One might be tempted to describe cases (8) – (10) as previously – as situations where it is impossible for me to have all the things I want. E.g. I want to smoke, but don’t want to incur the health risks and so forth. I have already indicated problems with conceptualising the thing that we’re restricted from doing in terms of a long open-ended list. But moreover, it is in any event perfectly possible for me to be completely indifferent to all the drawbacks of smoking and yet still be addicted.

(Aii) Higher order wants: An alternative possibility might be that, although I want to smoke, at the same time I want to not want to smoke. Anybody who has tried to give up smoking or any other addiction will be familiar enough with this. However, although it may be a correct description of some cases, it suffers from essentially the same problem as (Ai). A person who has no such higher order want – who is perfectly happy with wanting to smoke – might yet still be addicted. However, I will say more about higher-order desires a little later.

(B) I’m doing what I want, but my wanting to do it is not what’s causing me to do it.

For example, a person may enjoy drinking, like the taste, enjoy the social accompaniments and even enjoy the sensation of being drunk, and any or all of these may be the reason that the person drinks. On the other hand, the reason that the person drinks may be that she is an alcoholic. It may be that, for example, she might change her mind about the pleasantness of the taste of drink, about the desirability of pub company, and so on, and not find any reasons for wanting to drink left, but still drink. If this were the case, it would be reasonable to conclude that, before the person changed her mind, her drinking was not caused by those reasons, and conclude from this that she is an alcoholic. So her drinking, we might as well say, coincided with what she wanted to do, but was no more a free act than if someone held a gun to my head and made me sign an agreement to do something I wanted to do anyway. Although this may again be the correct description of some cases, it does not cover all, because an addiction may itself produce a want. So, even if a person has no other want either to drink or not to drink, she may, just because she is an alcoholic, want to drink and be caused to drink by that want.

(C) My wanting is what’s causing me to do the thing, but there is something amiss with my wants.

We need to say a bit more about higher-order wants. If having difficulty satisfying a higher-order want counts as a restriction on freedom, then the term ‘higher-order want’ may be plausibly extended to cover wants that are hypothetical. That is, it may cover what, all things considered according to my own judgement, I would want. The part about ‘my own judgement’ is important, because we don’t want to confine the term free to only actions that arise out of wants that are right according to some impersonal objective rational standard of which I’m unaware or which I would positively reject. But the part about ‘would want’, rather than positively do want, is important too. For many actions may arise out of wants that have no actual higher-order wants attached to them at all. An obvious example is eating because I’m hungry. The sum total of my attitudes towards eating may be: I’m hungry, so I want to eat. But, presumably, eating is also what I would want to do, taking all my wants into consideration (e.g. I don’t want to die). On the other hand, the sum total of an alcoholic’s attitudes towards drinking may be: I want more drink. Moreover, the alcoholic may even want to drink for other reasons as well – as mentioned above. But even if all the person’s attitudes about drinking are ‘pro-attitudes’, and one of those attitudes – the desire to drink itself – is what’s causing the person to drink, the person can still be an alcoholic. But we need some way to mark the difference between this and eating because one is hungry, or any number of other acts done out of unreflected-upon desires that are perfectly harmless. As an initial stab at this, I suggest that we make the difference that some unreflected-on desires would be what we would still decide was best, or at least no harm, were we to reflect. 
	But there is, I think, a deeper reason behind this – which is, that we would like to think that, were we to reflect and change our minds about the desirability of doing something, we would be able to act, or refrain from acting, as we saw best without being faced with obstacles from our own wants. This analysis has the advantage of connecting up with the earlier analyses of cases of restriction of freedom. For, now the fact that one is restricted stems from the fact that something would make it more difficult to do as one wanted, even if it isn’t actually preventing one from doing anything that one wants to do now. Even in the case of the happy alcoholic who wants to drink because of the taste, the pub company etc., her freedom to refrain from drinking is restricted because she would find it hard to refrain from drinking if she were to change her mind about the taste, the desirability of pub company and so forth. But, similarly, a person who is locked in is restricted in her freedom to leave the house, even if she doesn’t want to, because she would find it hard to leave were she to change her mind. So any freedom worth wanting has to involve being free from obstacles to doing something that I want, even if this wanting is only hypothetical, and whether those obstacles are external or internal. 

	The upshot of this, then, is that one can be restricted in one’s freedom to do something even if one doesn’t want to do that thing. And conversely, one can be restricted in one’s freedom to refrain from doing something, even if one wants to do that thing and has no actual wants that conflict with it. As an initial stab at formulating what it is about addictions, phobias and other psychological compulsions that makes them count as restrictions on freedom, I suggest this:

	A person is restricted in her freedom to X if
	[Note: I am not claiming ‘if and only if’]:

	That person would find it difficult to X if she wanted to.

And as a corollary:

	A person is restricted in her freedom to refrain from X’ing if:

	That person would find it difficult to refrain from X’ing if she wanted to 	refrain from X’ing.

	However, something is going to have to be added to this, to avoid counting as restrictions on freedom things that pretty clearly aren’t. This can be seen if we once again consider hunger. Clearly, most of us would find it difficult to refrain from eating even if we wanted to, because we would get hungry. But we don’t usually consider this a restriction on our freedom. The same goes for the desire to sleep, the desire to urinate, and so forth. One might be tempted to write such desires off as ‘normal’, and hence not possible to count as addictions, and hence not as restrictions on freedom. However, it is clearly a non sequitur to go from ‘this is not an addiction’ to ‘this is not a restriction on freedom’. Moreover, we at least owe the hard determinist the courtesy of allowing it to be possible that even perfectly normal circumstances can count as restrictions on freedom. That is, we shouldn’t claim it as an a priori truth that what’s normal can’t be a restriction on freedom. In any event, the term ‘normal’ is notoriously slippery, carrying with it a danger of slipping between ‘statistically average’ and something like ‘normative’ or ‘healthy’. Desires that are not statistically average do not just for that reason count as restrictions on freedom – otherwise we would have to count homosexual desires or very specialist tastes in music as restrictions on freedom. Further still, there might be specific situations where even desires that are ‘normal’ – in the senses of both statistically average and healthy – count as restrictions on freedom. A person might, for reasons that are very central to her world-view and ideals, decide to go on hunger strike, in which case hunger might be best thought of as a restriction on her freedom. Such things have been known to happen. Still, for most of us the desire to eat is not a restriction on freedom, and I suggest that this is because it is unlikely that it is going to conflict with another desire. To repeat what I said above, even if we don’t often consciously think about it, most of us want to stay alive, so the desire to eat is a desire to do something that we would be perfectly happy to do if we thought about it. So it is not sufficient for something to be a restriction on freedom, that it would make it hard to do something if we wanted to: the degree to which we are liable to actually want to do that thing is also a factor.
	The initial formulation needs modification for one further reason. I said above that freedom comes in degrees, something that is, admittedly, signalled by the inclusion of ‘finds it difficult to’ rather than just ‘can’t’. Even so, we might not want to call a very small degree of difficulty a restriction at all. No-one is completely free or completely unfree, but rather we are free or unfree to the degree that something is or isn’t the case. 

So my final formulation is:

	A person is restricted in her freedom to X to the degree that
	[Note again: not ‘only to the degree that’]:

	(1) That person would find it difficult to X if she wanted to, and
	(2) That person is liable to find herself wanting to X.

	This might make it clear why the claims of evolutionary psychologists give cause for concern. For they are claiming that various desires arise mandatorily, and moreover that those desires are not modified by other beliefs or desires that a person might have – just as the Muller-Lyer effect is not modified by the knowledge that the lines are really the same length. In this regard, these desires are similar to addictions, which are similarly recalcitrant to the knowledge that the thing you’re doing is bad for you. We might say: but surely the desires that evolutionary psychologists are talking about are normal, in the sense of statistically average and probably in the sense of healthy as well. So, surely, they are more like hunger than they are like addictions. However, this response is blocked by what I said above, that we should not make it an a priori truth that what is normal can’t be a restriction on freedom. This in itself doesn’t show that they are restrictions on freedom, however. 
	The worry that they might be restrictions on freedom arises from the evolutionary psychologists’ claim that our cognitive modules are an inheritance from the Stone Age, and hence are likely to be adaptations to life in the Stone Age. But what was adaptive in the Stone Age need not be adaptive now, and nor need it coincide with what we want now. The desires to eat, drink and sleep would not normally count as restrictions on freedom, however mandatory they might be, because eating, drinking and sleeping are all still things that, all things considered according to our own judgement, we would want to do. But the same may not be true of all the things that it was good for our Stone Age ancestors to do. Eating as much sweet food as possible was something that promoted the well-being of Stone Age humans, and so was something that, all things considered according to their own judgement, they would want to do. Even if they didn’t know that ripe fruit was more nutritious, they didn’t know of any reason why eating it would be a bad thing (and, ex hypothesi, there usually wasn’t any such reason). But nowadays a person, faced with a far greater amount of sugary foods, is reducing her fitness by pursuing the same strategy, acting on the same mandatorily-arising desires. That would not in itself make it a restriction on freedom, but there is the further fact that we now know that too much sweet food is bad for you. Hence, we are liable to not want to eat so much of it. Evolutionary psychology implies that we have automatic responses to situations that are fundamentally inappropriate to those situations, even if we have information that would enable us to respond more appropriately, and even if we want to respond more appropriately. Since the automatic responses are said to be desires, not actions, we are not prevented from making the appropriate response – that is the straw man of genetic determinism. But if the evolved responses really are as mandatory as the evolutionary psychologists claim, then they are going to make it difficult to do things that we are liable to want to, and to refrain from doing things that we want to refrain from doing. Hence, it looks like they are restrictions on our freedom.

	So what about Rose’s worry – that evolutionary psychologists are giving an excuse to philandering men? Since evolutionary psychologists see sexual desires as products of natural selection, and hence as based on modular cognitive architecture that kicks in automatically, it looks as though they are just as mandatory as the experience of sweet. Indeed, although evolutionary psychology aspires to being a complete theory of the underlying architecture of the human mind, the differences between the mating strategies of men and women are their number one favourite subject. They allege that it made sense for men in the Stone Age to be promiscuous, and for women to be highly selective, and that these strategies are embedded in preferences that are hard-wired into the human mind. So, prima facie, it looks as though they are saying that men are perpetually tempted to philander. This suggests, in turn, that it is hard for men to refrain from philandering, even if they want to refrain. So it looks as though evolutionary psychologists are claiming that men’s freedom is restricted in this regard. 
	However, this is only prima facie, and this is why we need to have a clearer account of what exactly is being claimed than has so far been given in the literature. Evolutionary psychologists are fond of pointing out that of course they don’t believe that it is inevitable that we will behave in the ways that our evolved cognitive architecture is designed to make us behave. Pinker cheerfully points out that, although he is a healthy, high status male, he has yet to produce any offspring: ‘I am happy to be that way, and if my genes don’t like it, they can go jump in the lake’ he declares (Pinker 1997, p. 52). The problem, though, is that it is not clear how they think this comes to be the case. It is a central pillar of their view that that all or nearly all of the underlying architecture of the human mind is modular. (For a sceptical view on this, see Fodor 2000.) But then, it is not clear just how the automatic responses get overridden. I am not here expressing scepticism about the claim that they are overridden, but pointing out that it is not clear what the mechanisms by means of which they are overridden are supposed to be. Unless we know this, we don’t know just how easy or difficult the automatic desires are to override. As per my formulation above, if they are very easy to override, they don’t count as restrictions on freedom at all, and so we have nothing to worry about. But since the evolutionary psychologists have given us nothing that would supply an answer to the question of how difficult it is, we don’t know to what extent – if any – they are giving excuses to ne’er-do-wells. Nor do we know just how hard it is for ourselves to escape biological destinies that might not appeal to us. Consequently, we don’t know just how worried we should be.
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^1	  It seems to me that in such a case it is a bit strained to say that she is not free to do what she wants, rather than that she just can’t do it. What is restricted, we might say, is her physical capacities, rather than her freedom. However, it can hardly be said to be reassuring to be told that one can’t do something one wants to, rather than that one is not free to do it. For present purposes, I will assume that it is acceptable to say that an incapacity such as this is a restriction of one’s freedom. At any rate, it clearly would count as something to be upset about, in the same way that the compatibilist says that real restrictions on freedom are something to be upset about.
